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Fidelity to Law and the Moral Pluralism Premise 
LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW.  By W. Bradley Wendel.  Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010.  286 pages.  $35.00. 
Reviewed by Katherine R. Kruse* 
Bradley Wendel is a pioneer on the new frontier of theoretical legal 
ethics.  Wendel follows the lead of William Simon in breaking from the 
long-dominant discourse of moral theory in legal ethics and moving legal 
ethics toward a jurisprudence of lawyering.1  Rather than pursuing the more 
traditional question of whether it is possible for good lawyers to be good 
persons, Wendel focuses our attention on what it means to be a good lawyer.  
One of the core functions of law practice is the interpretation of law.  Clients 
seek legal advice because they want to understand what the law says and how 
the law constrains their choices.  Because lawyers have the power to interpret 
and declare the law through legal advice, Wendel argues, they have a profes-
sional responsibility to interpret the law faithfully.2  Lawyers and Fidelity to 
Law is Wendel’s exploration of what it means for lawyers to fulfill this 
professional responsibility. 
Legal ethics, Wendel once wrote, must be “‘normative all the way 
down,’ with a theory of democracy justifying a theory of the function of law, 
which in turn justifies a conception of the lawyer’s role.”3  In Fidelity to Law, 
Wendel presents and defends such a comprehensive theory of lawyering with 
two interrelated arguments: a functional argument that law deserves respect 
because of its capacity to settle normative controversy in a morally pluralistic 
 
 * Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  I 
would like to thank each and every contributor to this Colloquy for his or her friendship, 
mentorship, and intellectual companionship.  You make legal ethics an exciting and rewarding field 
of study for me and for so many others.  I owe particular thanks to Steve Pepper and Brad Wendel 
for comments on this Review, and to Ben Zipursky for sharing his thoughts in more than one 
helpful discussion about Wendel’s book. 
1. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 194–200 (2010).  William 
Simon’s early work was based on jurisprudential theory.  See generally William H. Simon, The 
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 33–34 
[hereinafter Simon, Ideology of Advocacy] (arguing that “to take the value of individuality seriously 
would require the abandonment of the Ideology of Advocacy and of legal professionalism” and that 
“respect for the value of law itself may require the repudiation of legal professionalism”).  His break 
from moral theory became explicit in WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY 
OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998) [hereinafter SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE].  I have written more 
about this movement in Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 493 (2011). 
2. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 189. 
3. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1176–77 
(2005). 
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society and a normative argument that law deserves respect because demo-
cratic lawmaking processes respect the equality and dignity of citizens.  This 
Review focuses on one of the links in the chain of Wendel’s normative-all-
the-way-down argument: his move from the premise of moral pluralism to 
his conclusion that the function of law is to settle normative controversy in 
society. 
I question Wendel’s move on both practical and theoretical grounds.  
Practically, it is questionable that law has the capacity to settle moral 
controversy—at least the deepest kind of controversy that society is unable to 
settle as a result of reasonable moral pluralism.  And that is important, 
because at the deepest level of Wendel’s normative-all-the-way-down 
argument, law’s capacity to do something for us that we cannot do for 
ourselves is the source of the respect that we owe the law.4  More 
importantly, I question whether, in a morally pluralistic society, we should 
want law to settle normative controversy.  Wendel argues that we need to 
settle such controversies so that we can move on and organize our affairs de-
spite our deep disagreement about values.  I argue, however, that efforts to 
unsettle law need not be seen as a threat: the continual ebb and flow of nor-
mative controversy can be viewed as an incident of, rather than an 
impediment to, a free and just society. 
I. Wendel’s Argument from the Moral Pluralism Premise 
Fidelity to Law reinterprets the traditional partisan, and morally neutral, 
role morality of lawyers, grounding legal ethics in both jurisprudential and 
political theory.  True to Wendel’s earlier work,5 Fidelity to Law neither 
condones lawyers’ minimal technical adherence to the law governing lawyers 
nor simply refers lawyers to moral values for guidance.  Although in the past 
Wendel has argued that legal–professional values are plural,6 he now centers 
his theory of legal ethics around a single overarching value: fidelity to law.  
Wendel reshapes lawyers’ duty of partisanship around clients’ legal 
entitlements—defined as “what the law, properly interpreted, actually 
provides” for a client7—rather than the zealous pursuit of a client’s legal 
interests.8  And Wendel reinterprets lawyers’ traditional duty of moral 
 
4. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 89 (“The procedures of the legal system . . . constitute a means 
for living together, treating one another with respect, and cooperating toward common ends, despite 
moral diversity and disagreement.  The values of dignity and equality therefore underwrite the claim 
of the legal system to have a right to the respect of citizens.”). 
5. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1 (1999) (outlining an approach to the study of values in the legal profession). 
6. See id. at 37 (stating that “a satisfying account of professional responsibility must allow for 
plural values”); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 
113, 116 (2000) (“[T]he foundational normative values of lawyering are substantively plural and, in 
many cases, incommensurable.”). 
7. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 59. 
8. Id. at 78–79. 
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neutrality toward their clients’ ends as respect for the authority of law even in 
the face of disagreement with its substantive justice.9 
Wendel grounds legal ethics in a jurisprudence heavily influenced by 
H.L.A. Hart’s positivism.  Wendel’s fidelity to law precludes gamesmanship 
and sharp practices that toy with the ordinary meaning of law as understood 
within the accepted interpretive practices of lawyers, judges, and other par-
ticipants in the legal system.10  These shared interpretive practices form what 
he calls the “rule[s] of recognition” within the legal profession,11 allowing 
lawyers to judge some interpretations as more plausible than others.12  
Wendel also argues that fidelity to law requires lawyers to view law from an 
internal point of view that credits law with being “about something”—
directed at purposes that authorize behavior as socially beneficial.13  Law is a 
reason-giving domain capable of separation from morality, he argues, and 
lawyers exhibit fidelity to law by providing their clients with legal reasons 
for action.14  As a corollary, although lawyers are free to provide moral 
counseling, fidelity to law precludes lawyers from inserting their moral 
judgments into legal representation by nullifying unjust laws covertly or by 
“dress[ing] up moral advice as a judgment about what the law permits.”15 
The Hartian positivism that influences Wendel’s jurisprudence of 
lawyering is grounded even more deeply (normative all the way down) in a 
theory about the legitimacy of law.16  Wendel insists that the legitimacy of 
law must be established on a basis that is independent of its content, defining 
legitimate legal systems as those that provide a basis to respect law’s author-
ity even for those who believe that the law is substantively unjust.17  In a 
society characterized by reasonable moral pluralism, Wendel argues, 
assessments of the substantive justice of a law cannot provide a basis for 
shared judgments about the law’s legitimacy because citizens will disagree 
about the normative criteria for measuring justice.18  The fairness of the 
procedures by which law is enacted provides a similarly unstable basis for 
legitimacy, because reasonable persons in a pluralistic society will disagree 
about the criteria for judging procedural fairness.19 
 
9. Id. at 88. 
10. Id. at 190–94. 
11. Id. at 196–98. 
12. Id. at 186. 
13. Id. at 196. 
14. Id. at 194–95. 
15. Id. at 139. 
16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Daniel C.K. Chow, A Pragmatic Model 
of Law, 67 WASH. L. REV. 755, 816 n.286 (1992) (explaining that the persuasive power of law, 
which stems from the “political justification” of rules, forms the crux of Hart’s positivism). 
17. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 87–88. 
18. Id. at 88. 
19. Id. at 102. 
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Although he does not separate them neatly, Wendel provides two 
interrelated arguments for establishing the legitimacy of law in a morally 
pluralistic society: a functional argument and a normative argument.  
Wendel’s functional argument is based on the capacity of law to transform 
brute demands into claims of legal entitlement.20  Law deserves respect even 
from those who disagree with its substantive justice, Wendel argues, because 
law establishes a stable framework within which citizens can coordinate their 
activities despite the deep, persistent, and ultimately irreconcilable normative 
controversy that characterizes a morally pluralistic society.21  Borrowing 
from Jeremy Waldron, Wendel argues that as a morally pluralistic society we 
are in the “circumstances of politics,” meaning that we recognize the need for 
a stable framework for cooperation and cannot agree on the normative basis 
for that framework, but we are committed to treating each other as equals and 
with respect.22  Law provides a way to transcend the competing demands of 
underlying normative controversy and transform them into agreed-upon 
criteria of legality.23  According to Wendel, this is a significant achievement: 
law “makes a viable and lasting community possible in the kind of society 
we inhabit, characterized by a diversity of religious and ethical viewpoints,” 
because law permits us to “recognize obligations to one another, mediated 
through the political institutions of our society, despite substantive 
disagreements.”24  Because law does something for society that it cannot do 
for itself, Wendel argues, law has practical authority: law’s settlement of 
normative controversy provides us with a reason to comply with law that is 
independent of whether the law got the resolution of the controversy right.25 
Wendel’s functional argument is underwritten by a normative argument 
that law is entitled to respect because the democratic lawmaking processes 
through which it is enacted respect the equality and dignity of citizens.26  
There are ways to settle normative controversy in society that are not 
normatively attractive, Wendel points out, such as installing a dictator.27  
Settlement of normative controversy through the use of force might compel 
compliance with law, but it would not provide citizens with a reason to re-
spect the authority of law.  There are also ways to settle a controversy that 
are random, like flipping a coin, or corrupt, like taking a bribe.28  In 
Wendel’s view, random or corrupt processes would not garner the necessary 
respect for the authority of law, because the settlement they would provide 
would not be based on a balancing of the underlying reasons.  To garner 
 
20. Id. at 89. 
21. Id. at 97. 
22. Id. at 90. 
23. Id. at 91. 
24. Id. at 97. 
25. Id. at 107–13. 
26. Id. at 89. 
27. Id. at 98. 
28. Id. at 111. 
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respect, law must be the product of processes that meet what Wendel calls 
the moral constraint of equality by using fair procedures that are reasonably 
responsive to citizen demands for participation.29  Law gains its legitimacy, 
in Wendel’s view, when it is decided according to processes “adequately . . . 
responsive to citizen demands for participation.”30 
There is a tension between Wendel’s functional and normative 
arguments for respecting the authority of law.  Without the normative 
argument to back it up, the functional argument devolves into nothing more 
than force backed by sanctions, failing to provide a basis for viewing law 
from Hart’s “internal point of view” as an independent source of guidance 
for societal behavior.31  However, if the normative argument sets too high of 
a standard for procedural fairness and participation, the functional capacity of 
law to settle normative controversy begins to unravel into second-order 
controversies over contested notions of fairness in society.32  Wendel 
resolves the tension in favor of finality.33  Wendel sets a relatively low 
threshold for fairness,34 requiring fidelity to law as long as laws are enacted 
according to “tolerably fair” procedures that reflect “rough equality” among 
citizens.35  To demand more, Wendel argues, would deprive law of the 
capacity “to settle conflict and establish a provisional basis for coordinated 
action.”36 
As a result of this low threshold, Wendel’s functional argument ends up 
doing most of the work in his theory of legal ethics.  The functional argument 
provides an independent reason to respect the authority of law: because 
normative controversy is really difficult to settle in a morally pluralistic 
society and law’s capacity to transform competing normative demands into 
agreed-upon criteria of legality is an achievement worthy of respect.  And, 
the functional argument plays a significant limiting role with respect to a 
purely normative argument that law deserves respect because (and only to the 
extent that) it is enacted according to a fair and inclusive lawmaking 
process.37  Because citizens can be counted on to disagree about the fairness 
of legal process, the functional need to settle normative controversy requires 
that the standards of fair processes remain exceedingly lax. 
 
29. Id. at 91. 
30. Id. 
31. See id. at 102 (explaining that setting the bar of legitimacy—which is discussed in the 
normative argument—too low risks allowing an authoritative regime). 
32. Id. at 101–02. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 102. 
35. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
36. Id. 
37. See id. at 101–02 (asserting that while the normative requirement of fairness is an important 
aspect of legitimacy, the functional requirement of finality must predominate in order to avoid 
political gridlock). 
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II. What Follows from the Moral-Pluralism Premise? 
It would be possible to take issue with Wendel on the moral-pluralism 
premise itself and to argue that society is much more normatively cohesive 
than Wendel paints it to be.  As a fellow traveler in addressing the challenges 
of moral pluralism for legal ethics, I do not take that tack.38  Instead, I raise 
two problems with Wendel’s claim about what follows from the moral-
pluralism premise: (1) whether, as a practical matter, law has the capacity to 
settle the kinds of deep, intractable moral controversies posed by the moral-
pluralism premise, and (2) whether, as a theoretical matter, we should want 
law to play this settlement function. 
A. The Moral-Pluralism Premise 
The moral-pluralism premise is, at its essence, a claim that there can be, 
and is, a plurality of reasonable moral viewpoints in society.39  In a morally 
pluralistic society, people disagree about moral judgments based on 
competing comprehensive conceptions of morality drawn from a variety of 
philosophical and religious sources, none of which can be objectively 
deemed “right” or “wrong” from a standpoint outside its own theoretical 
framework.  The claim of reasonable moral pluralism is not simply that 
moral disagreement exists in society but that moral disagreement is 
reasonable and predictable.  As John Rawls put it, a plurality of moral and 
religious views is “the natural outcome of . . . human reason under enduring 
free institutions” and a permanent feature of modern democratic societies.40 
Because of its general application, law declares societal norms that 
apply across competing moral viewpoints and attaches sanctions to 
disobedience of those norms.  Yet, to be effective in creating societal repose, 
these declarations must be accepted as legitimate.  When enacted into law, 
societal norms become ensconced in specific language, which opens up space 
for technical manipulation of law’s language.  The sanctions attached to 
disobedience of law similarly open up space for citizens to skirt legal 
sanctions with the attitude of a classic Holmesian bad man “who cares only 
for the material consequences which . . . knowledge [of the law] enables him 
to predict.”41  Because of this interpretive and enforcement “play” within the 
law, any settlement of normative controversy in law will be continually 
 
38. See Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 389, 396–402 (2005) (comparing and contrasting different theories on the sources of moral 
pluralism but embracing moral pluralism as a whole). 
39. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 88. 
40. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xxiv (2005). 
41. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, 
Address at the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1897). 
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undermined by interpretive games and covert disobedience by citizens whose 
strongly held moral beliefs run counter to law’s settlement.42 
If settlement of normative controversy is the aim and function of law, 
then Wendel’s criterion of legitimacy—that law must be capable of deciding 
normative controversy in a way that satisfies those who believe that it has 
been decided incorrectly—is the correct standard to apply.  To garner a level 
of respect for law’s authority that rules out those kinds of maneuvers, law 
must do more than merely declare a victor in a societal battle of normative 
wills.  Law must provide a reason for respect that is strong enough to trump 
the moral reasons to avoid law’s reach that inevitably will be held by citizens 
who believe that the law has been wrongly decided. 
B. Can Law Settle Normative Controversy in a Morally Pluralistic Society? 
Wendel’s description of the way law settles normative controversy can 
be seen as an allegory whose narrative structure casts deep and persistent 
normative controversy as trouble and law as the hero, rescuing society from 
discord.43  In this narrative, society is unable to reason its way out of deep 
and intractable normative controversy but nevertheless needs to settle nor-
mative controversy so that it can move on in relative peace and harmony.  To 
solve this problem, society submits a matter to the legal process, which trans-
forms the dispute into settled law about which society can agree.  Wendel’s 
functional argument in a nutshell is that we should respect the law, despite 
our moral disagreement with its content, because law does for us something 
that we cannot do for ourselves: law rescues us from moral pluralism.44 
In this subpart, I argue that Wendel’s allegorical narrative about the way 
law settles normative controversy is not fully accurate.  Although law plays a 
role in the complex interaction between legal and social norms that charac-
terize both microdecisions about compliance with law in an area of 
normative contest and on the larger stage of law and social movements, the 
translation of normative controversy into legal language does not fulfill the 
settlement role on which Wendel’s functional argument rests.  If law lacks 
the capacity to settle deep and persistent normative controversy in society, 
then Wendel’s functional argument for the legitimacy of law falls away.  If it 
 
42. See SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 37–41 (identifying interpretation and 
enforcement as the most important problems with the “Positivist premise” of legal norms); Simon, 
Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 1, at 44–46 (explaining that citizens use their “procedural 
discretion to thwart the enforcement of the substantive rules . . . in accordance with their individual 
ends”). 
43. This is an implicit reference to the work on narrative structure by Anthony Amsterdam and 
Jerome Bruner.  See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 158–59 
(2000) (describing two Supreme Court decisions on race-based controversies as “avert[ing] . . . 
catastrophes” and comparing the Court’s role to that of the ancient Greek hero Menelaus). 
44. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 9 (“[T]he function of the law is to provide a reasoned 
settlement of empirical uncertainty and normative controversy, and a basis for cooperative 
activity . . . .”). 
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turns out that law is a non-autonomous realm in which deep and persistent 
normative controversy continues to be contested even when translated into 
legal terms, then we have no special reason to respect the provisional settle-
ments of positive law—legislative acts, judicial decisions, and constitutional 
amendments—simply because they are law. 
Although I take issue with Wendel’s claim that law has the capacity to 
settle deep and persistent normative controversy in society, I separate that 
from the related claim that law creates a framework that permits us to coor-
dinate productive societal activity.45  In my view, the latter claim—that law 
has the capacity to coordinate productive societal activity—paints a largely 
accurate picture of the function of law.  Law tells us on which side of the 
road to drive and on what day to pay our taxes.  Law provides structures for 
administrative regulation of the environment, workplace health and safety, 
transportation systems, financial markets, and many other activities where 
private activity affects the public good.  Law provides rules for establishing 
property rights in everything from land to intellectual property.  Law 
provides avenues of private redress to compensate persons who have been 
injured by the negligent actions of others.  Law creates standards and proce-
dures for entering and becoming a citizen of the country.  In these ways and 
many others, law functions to order our affairs and enable us to live together 
in a large and complex society. 
It is also accurate, in my view, to say that normative judgments are 
woven into the fabric of legal standards and procedures.  These normative 
judgments can be understood to fall on a continuum from uncontroversial to 
hotly contested.  Some normative judgments—like the very idea that prop-
erty can and should be owned—are open to possible moral criticism but are 
so deeply embedded in our societal norms that they are rarely questioned.  
Other normative judgments embedded in the law—like the idea that animals 
can be owned as property or that the government has the right to levy taxes—
enjoy generalized societal acceptance with pockets of resistance by fringe or 
countercultural groups.46  Still other normative judgments—like the idea that 
marriage should be limited to unions between a man and a woman or 
(alternatively) should be extended to same-sex couples—are the subject of 
broad and divisive moral controversy.47 
Where I depart from Wendel is in the central claim of his functional 
argument that law has the capacity to settle a hotly contested controversy 
 
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
46. See, e.g., IRWIN SCHIFF, THE FEDERAL MAFIA: HOW IT ILLEGALLY IMPOSES AND 
UNLAWFULLY COLLECTS INCOME TAXES 11 (2d ed. 1992) (arguing that paying income tax is 
“strictly voluntary” because a compulsory income tax would be unconstitutional); Diane Sullivan & 
Holly Vietzke, An Animal Is Not an iPod, 4 J. ANIMAL L. 41, 58 (2008) (concluding that the 
American legal system should not classify animals as property because “animals are sentient 
creatures capable of experiencing great pain”). 
47. See infra notes 56–71 and accompanying text. 
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over societal norms.48  With respect to the deeply divisive moral issues in 
society, it is more plausible to say that law provides a medium through which 
normative controversy can be (and continues to be) contested.  As scholars 
who study law and society acknowledge, the interaction between legal and 
social norms is complex.  At the micro level of framing and settling disputes, 
law often plays a peripheral role compared to more dominant social norms.49  
Although the law provides the contours within which private ordering occurs, 
as exemplified by Mnookin and Kornhauser’s famous metaphor of dispute 
resolution “in the shadow of the law,”50 these contours are indistinct,51 and 
they expand or contract as law interacts with social norms in low-level-legal 
and extralegal decision making.52  A similarly complex interplay of legal and 
social norms occurs at the macro level.53  As scholars who study legal reform 
and social movements relate, law absorbs and reflects underlying normative 
controversy through cycles of backlash, co-optation, and bureaucratic 
resistance to contested legislative enactments and judicial rulings.54  
Submitting a normative controversy to the legal process can frame and 
transform the terms of the underlying normative controversy, and the legal 
process can mobilize collective action.55  But law does not in any real sense 
“settle” the controversy. 
 
48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 4 (1991) (contending that neighbors develop and enforce adaptive norms of 
neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements); Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer 
Protection Laws, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 115, 117 (1979) (arguing that “the politics of bargaining” 
often has a more significant influence on professional practice than legal norms). 
50. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (providing a framework for considering how 
courtroom rules and procedures affect bargaining that occurs outside the courtroom). 
51. Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used 
to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 395 (“Americans bargain in the shadow of the law, but shadows are 
usually distortions of the object between the sun and the ground.”). 
52. For a summary of literature on this subject, see Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the 
Law, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 565–71 (1992).  Some scholars of law and society go so far as to 
characterize systems of private ordering as a form of law and to describe the interaction among 
systems of ordering as a “legal pluralism.”  See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 869, 889–90 (1988) (concluding that legal pluralism, including “sociolegal 
phenomena,” moves away from the ideology of legal centralism and suggests attention to other 
forms of ordering and their interaction with state law). 
53. See generally CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. 
Scheingold eds., 2006) (describing the social movements that have been created by lawyers 
performing work in specific areas of concern); JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978) (examining several 
attempts that have been made to use the legal system to affect social change). 
54. For a summary of this literature, see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: 
Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2007). 
55. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from 
Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 604 (2009) (describing the use of litigation to 
facilitate social change as “an imperfect but indispensable strategy”). 
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The current moral and legal controversy over same-sex marriage in the 
United States illustrates the dynamic influences that evade settlement of 
normative controversy through law.  The earliest same-sex marriage cases 
were litigated in the mid-1970s, when four state courts rejected legal 
challenges to marriage laws brought by same-sex couples.56  Those cases 
were brought in the early days of the post-Stonewall-riots gay rights 
movement when societal attitudes condemning homosexuality had not yet 
been significantly unsettled,57 and the idea that marriage was limited to 
unions between a man and a woman was so widely shared as to be virtually 
unquestionable.58  Needless to say, the plaintiffs in those cases resoundingly 
lost their legal claims and, in some cases, suffered other forms of discrimi-
natory treatment as a result of their activism.59 
However, by the time same-sex marriage resurfaced as a legal issue in 
the 1990s, societal norms about homosexuality were in greater flux, and the 
same-sex marriage issue was met with a dizzying sequence of legal successes 
and failures for both pro- and anti-same-sex-marriage advocacy groups.60  
Courts in some states recognized the right to marry,61 setting off a backlash 
of federal and state “defense-of-marriage” acts to legislatively prevent the 
 
56. Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same Sex Marriage 
Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 53, at 84, 84. 
57. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1423–
24 (1993) (observing that gay rights issues were “suppressed or ignored” before the Stonewall riots, 
and that even after the riots, activists struggled for over twenty years to secure “some of the same 
benefits regularly bestowed upon different-sex couples”). 
58. Id. at 1427–29 (asserting that early court opinions rejecting arguments in favor of a right to 
gay marriage relied on the ground that same-sex marriage did not fit within the societal definition of 
marriage). 
59. John Singer, the plaintiff in a 1974 Washington state case, was fired from a federal civil-
service position for his activism.  Barclay & Fisher, supra note 56, at 89.  Jay Baker, a student 
activist who litigated a 1971 same-sex marriage case came under scrutiny in his application to the 
Minnesota Bar for filing marriage documents and for being openly gay.  Id. at 89–90. 
60. See generally Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010) (arguing against the thesis that same-sex-marriage litigation 
undercuts the ends pursued by the gay rights movement); Eskridge, supra note 57 (recounting the 
history of same-sex marriage); Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 
54 DRAKE L. REV. 861 (2006) (discussing the ambiguous results of legal efforts to effect social 
change regarding perceptions of homosexuality).  The continually unfolding history of the 
gay-marriage debate is catalogued online on Wikipedia.  Wikipedia, Same-Sex Marriage in the 
United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex_marriage_in_the_United_States (last modified 
Nov. 7, 2011). 
61. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 409, 453 (Cal. 2008) (holding that a family code 
provision stating that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California” is unconstitutional); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55, 67 (Haw. 1993) (recognizing the 
right to marry and holding that a law that, on its face, discriminates based on sex against the 
applicant–couples in the exercise of the civil right of marriage implicates the equal protection clause 
of the Hawaiian constitution and requires a court to apply a strict scrutiny test); Goodridge v. Dep’t 
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (“[B]arring an individual from the protections, 
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the 
same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”). 
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recognition of same-sex marriages from other states.62  Anti-same-sex-
marriage activists mobilized to pass legislation and constitutional 
amendments to limit marriage to unions between a man and a woman, 
sometimes accompanied by the creation of special legal status for “domestic 
partners,”63 which were in turn held to violate some state constitutions.64  
Rather than settling the normative controversy over homosexuality and gay 
marriage, law became an arena in which the controversy over gay marriage 
was, and continues to be, contested.65 
Although it is problematic to say that law has “settled” the underlying 
normative controversy over same-sex marriage in the United States, it is 
equally problematic to contend that law has played no role.  As in many 
social movements, the legal process has shaped and arguably transformed the 
debate.  For example, the earliest judicial cases in the 1970s “settled” the law 
decisively against same-sex marriage for another twenty years.66  Yet, 
widening the lens to consider the role those lawsuits played within the larger 
gay rights social movement, the very act of litigating the cases was arguably 
an important “claiming” of the idea of same-sex marriage, appropriating it 
from Equal Rights Amendment opponents—who were presenting the idea of 
gay marriage as part of the parade of horribles likely to result from passing a 
constitutional amendment against sex discrimination67—and transforming the 
idea of same-sex marriage “from the ridiculous to the possible.”68  As the 
ensuing same-sex-marriage debate continues, the language of law continues 
to provide ways to formulate and package the issues in the debate.  Around 
the same time the early same-sex-marriage cases were being decided, 
William Rehnquist analogized homosexuality to a public health concern, 
saying that the question of whether gay student groups should be able to 
organize on campus was “akin to whether those suffering from measles have 
a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine regulations, to associate 
together and with others who do not presently have measles.”69  More 
 
62. Schacter, supra note 60, at 869. 
63. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 60, at 1250; Schacter, supra note 60, at 869–70. 
64. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (holding 
that a statute banning same-sex marriage but providing for civil unions failed intermediate scrutiny 
under the state constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding a marriage 
statute that provides unequal rights to same-sex couples unconstitutional under the state 
constitution). 
65. The latest big event was the passage of legislation permitting same-sex marriage in New 
York.  Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming 
Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-new-york-senate.html. 
66. See Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1427 n.17 (chronicling a number of the judicial decisions 
rejecting the same-sex marriage argument from 1971 to 1993).  When the first modern gay-marriage 
case was brought in Hawaii, social-movement lawyers advised against it, thinking that the time was 
not yet right to mount a legal challenge.  Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 60, at 1250. 
67. Barclay & Fisher, supra note 56, at 86–87, 90–91. 
68. Id. at 91. 
69. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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recently—and controversially—gay-marriage proponents have analogized 
state prohibitions on same-sex marriage to miscegenation laws, drawing on 
both civil rights history and the language of civil rights.70  Equally 
controversially, gay-marriage opponents have analogized same-sex marriage 
restrictions to laws prohibiting bigamy, drawing on the history of state 
protection of marriage against First Amendment claims arising out of 
religious pluralism.71 
Wendel recognizes the possibility of law to “transform brute demands 
into claims of [legal] entitlement[s]” and sees in it law’s potential to settle 
normative controversy: by translating normative controversy into legal terms, 
we are able to deliberate about it as a society rather than simply “expressing 
bare desires, like a toddler throwing a tantrum.”72  What Wendel overlooks in 
this argument is that normative debate already transcends tantrum throwing 
and provides ways to frame disagreement with reference to reason and the 
public good.  In a morally pluralistic society, the normative claims under 
dispute are not the expressions of “brute demands” but are appeals to deeply 
and sincerely held beliefs about the right and the good.  Although translating 
these controversies into legal terms calls in additional resources by invoking 
the language of law and the precedential histories that attach to it, the deep 
and persistent underlying normative controversies do not suddenly become 
more agreeable through this transformation. 
C. Should Law Settle Normative Controversy in a Morally Pluralistic 
Society? 
In the previous subpart, I took issue with Wendel’s normative-all-the-
way-down argument at its deepest level, in which he grounds the lawyer’s 
role in society in a conception of the function of law to settle normative 
controversy.  As we climb back up the normative ladder to examine the role 
of lawyers in society, what is most at stake is the legitimacy of lawyers’ 
professional activities advising and assisting clients in the “shadow of the 
law.”73  Wendel is sensitive to the need for openness in the political process, 
emphasizing that law should be seen as establishing “only a provisional 
 
70. See Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1423–34 (describing the pro- and anti-gay marriage 
arguments based on liberal legal theory).  See generally Randall Kennedy, Marriage and the 
Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 781 (discussing the parallels 
between civil rights history and current gay rights issues). 
71. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the constitutionality of both state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and state laws prohibiting 
bigamy could be called into question based on the majority’s ruling that a state law criminalizing 
homosexual conduct was unconstitutional).  In 1879, the United States Supreme Court upheld a 
criminal statute prohibiting bigamy in the Territory of Utah against the religious objection of a 
member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormon Church) who challenged the 
constitutionality of the law and its application to him on First Amendment grounds.  Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–67 (1879). 
72. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
73. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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settlement” that “creates a structure or a framework of moderate stability” 
within which “disagreement remains possible.”74  And he endorses resistance 
to the existing provisional settlement that law provides through “legally 
established means”75 and even through public and symbolic campaigns of 
lawbreaking aimed at persuading the community of the injustice of settled 
law.76  What fidelity to settled law rules out is covert nullification or 
subversion of legal norms to meet selfish and private ends,77 and acts of civil 
disobedience that “destabiliz[e] the common framework of legal 
entitlements,” even when pursued out of a belief that the law is unjust.78 
Others argue that the law retains an open and evolving character, not 
only through formal legal challenge and acts of principled civil disobedience 
but also through the intentional flouting of law by acquisitive and self-
interested lawbreakers.79  And we can see something approaching this in the 
same-sex marriage debate, where private action in contravention of settled 
law has been at work steadily under the radar of the formal legal challenges, 
as same-sex couples have gone quietly about the task of forming alternative 
families, using legal standards originally designed for guardianship and 
adoption of at-risk children.80  The democratic legitimacy of judicial 
interpretations that stretch or skirt statutory language to approve second-
parent adoption is questionable but can be defended by appealing to “thicker 
democratic values” that view enacted law as only one of the pieces in a larger 
and more dynamic account of democratic legitimacy.81  These thicker demo-
cratic values would also endorse the quiet individual relief that same-sex 
couples have gained against settled law in uncontested trial-court adoption 
cases.  Under this thicker view of democratic legitimacy, the quiet stretching, 
or (more radically) flouting, of the law to create new social forms of family 
or property ownership is an important way of opening up society to a 
plurality of life forms and choices, to which the law is then able to respond.82 
 
74. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 129. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 124–25. 
77. Id. at 131–35. 
78. Id. at 124–25. 
79. See, e.g., Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1095, 1106 (2007) (describing settlers in the nineteenth-century American West as flouting 
established property laws to set up “communities governed by their own conception of just, albeit 
self-serving, property relations” and noting that while this was initially condemned, “the law slowly 
but surely adapted itself to the reality the settlers had created on the ground”). 
80. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 
78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990) (discussing different ways courts may address the legal challenges posed 
by an increasing number of same-sex couples with children); Jane S. Schacter, Constructing 
Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
933 (2000) (discussing different courts’ use of statutory interpretation to stretch existing adoption-
law statutes to meet the legal challenges posed by same-sex adoptions). 
81. Schacter, supra note 80, at 947–49. 
82. Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 79, at 1098; Schacter, supra note 80, at 947–49. 
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Wendel’s ideals for the democratic values of procedural fairness and 
participation are by contrast admittedly thin and focused on majoritarian 
legislative decision making.  He accepts as legitimate any decisions made 
through legal processes that are “adequately (not ideally) responsive to 
citizen demands for participation.”83  Laws are legitimate, he argues, even if 
they are skewed by differentials in wealth and power84 and reinforced by 
structural inequality and discrimination in education, housing, and 
employment;85 even if lawmaking processes are distorted by political 
maneuvering that avoids “respectful consideration of competing points of 
view.”86  And, Wendel’s theory of legitimacy requires citizens to tolerate 
“localized injustice” toward the targets of irrational majoritarian bias.87  The 
legal process does the best it can to take “opposing viewpoints as seriously as 
possible,” Wendel argues, but “[a]t some point the majority is entitled to say, 
‘we have heard enough,’ and move on.”88 
Wendel accepts this thin procedural account of legitimacy because he 
concludes that in a morally pluralistic society, “it likely is the best we can 
do.”89  Insisting on too idealized of a conception of fair process, he argues, 
will leave “no way for a society to use the legal system to bootstrap itself 
out” of deep and persistent moral controversy.90  But if the legal system is 
largely ineffective in bootstrapping society out of deep and persistent moral 
controversy, this concern falls away, opening the way for a thicker and more 
robust conception of procedural fairness and the legitimacy of legal process 
to emerge. 
The loss of faith in law’s capacity to settle normative controversy may 
seem to be a jurisprudential nightmare of society mired in ever-spiraling 
normative controversy without any authoritative way out of the quagmire of 
moral pluralism.  Yet the flipside of law’s failure to settle normative contro-
versy is law’s capacity to open space within the law for a plurality of moral 
viewpoints to thrive.  This, I would argue, is not a jurisprudential nightmare, 
but the “Noble Dream”91 of a flexible and responsive legal system.  The idea 
 
83. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 91. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. (arguing that laws are legitimate in America, even though “the ability of many 
citizens to participate in the political process is limited by . . . differentials in wealth and power . . . 
reinforced by structural features such as inequality in primary and secondary education” as well as 
persistent discrimination against women and minorities). 
86. Id. at 100. 
87. Id. at 103. 
88. Id. at 101. 
89. Id. at 91. 
90. Id. at 102. 
91. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 978 (1977) (describing the “Noble Dream” as litigants’ belief that a 
judge will “apply to their cases existing law and not make new law for them” even if precedent and 
black-letter law are ambiguous).  David Luban has appropriated Hart’s metaphor to describe a 
jurisprudence of lawyering.  DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 131–32 (2007). 
2012] Fidelity to Law and the Moral Pluralism Premise 671 
 
that society should aim for flexibility and openness in the face of moral 
pluralism rather than seek the settlement of moral controversy finds support 
within much of liberal political theory.  When Mill, for example, writes about 
the need for protection against the “tyranny of the majority,” he means not 
only the tyranny of majority opinion enacted into law, but a broader “tyranny 
of the prevailing opinion and feeling” and “tendency of society to impose, by 
other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of con-
duct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if 
possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its 
ways.”92  Isaiah Berlin, rejecting the idea that “a total harmony of true values 
is somewhere to be found,”93 argued that the “precondition for decent 
societies” was to minimize the inevitable social and political collisions of a 
pluralistic society “by promoting and preserving an uneasy equilibrium, 
which is constantly threatened and in constant need of repair.”94  Societal 
order and stability are important values according to these political 
philosophers, but so are openness, flexibility, and progress.95  And in their 
view, the existence of normative controversy is not nearly as troublesome as 
society’s attempts to settle it. 
In such a thicker conception, lawyers’ fidelity to law need not be 
confined to respecting the authority of law settled according to thin 
procedural standards of adequate fairness.  Legitimate legal process would 
extend beyond majoritarian lawmaking to include the complex interplay 
created between private compliance with (or deviance from) law and public 
lawmaking.  Rather than being arbiters of law’s legitimacy, the role of 
lawyers would be defined by their participation in the legal process of 
legitimizing or destabilizing law based on the clients’ case-by-case 
judgments about law’s legitimacy—whether law was deserving of their 
respect and compliance.  And the professional responsibilities of lawyers 
would spring from their facilitative role as intermediaries between their cli-
ents and the law, requiring lawyers to make law accessible enough to assist 
clients in informed decision making about the legitimacy of marginal 
compliance or noncompliance. 
 
92. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5, 8–9 (John Gray 
ed., 1991). 
93. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 213 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). 
94. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1, 19 
(Henry Hardy ed., 1990); see also ISAIAH BERLIN, The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West, in 
THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY, supra, at 20, 47 (“[T]he best that one can do [in the face of 
moral pluralism] is to try to promote some kind of equilibrium, necessarily unstable, between the 
different aspirations of differing groups of human beings . . . .”). 
95. For example, Mill argued that order and progress were both necessary to good government 
but that order was included within progress, “not [as] an additional end to be reconciled with 
Progress, but a part and means of Progress itself.”  JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations on 
Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 92, at 203, 223. 
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Conclusion 
Bradley Wendel’s Lawyers and Fidelity to Law is a remarkable step and 
a valuable contribution to the jurisprudence of lawyering that is emerging in 
the field of theoretical legal ethics.  Although I disagree with him in the 
details of the jurisprudence of lawyering that he has developed, I do so 
largely within the contours of a debate that he has been instrumental in 
defining.  Wendel’s insistence that lawyers are quasi-political actors, his 
vision of legal ethics as normative all the way down, and his sensitivity to the 
challenges of moral pluralism set important parameters for the continuing 
debate.  After Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, legal ethics will never be the 
same. 
